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Zusammenfassung
Die Herausbildung eines europäischen Demos mit einer kollektiven Identität ist eine der
Voraussetzungen zur Behebung des Legitimitätsproblems der Europäischen Union (EU).
In der Analyse wird empirisch zu klären versucht, ob es hinreichende Gemeinsamkeiten in
den politischen Wertorientierungen der Europäer gibt, die eine kollektive Identität
begründen können. Vor allem angesichts der Osterweiterung der EU stellt sich die Frage,
ob die kulturelle Heterogenität in Europa nicht zu groß ist, um einen Europäischen Demos
zu ermöglichen. Hinsichtlich der politischen Wertorientierungen der Bürger in den
europäischen Ländern lässt sich eine West-Ost-Achse identifizieren. Das Ausmaß
demokratischer Einstellungen nimmt nach Osten hin ab, und zugleich nimmt das Ausmaß
etatistischer Orientierungen zu. Relative Schwellenwerte innerhalb dieser Achse lassen
sich zwischen Westeuropa einerseits und Mittel- und Osteuropa andererseits feststellen und
innerhalb Mittel- und Osteuropas zu den slawischen Nachfolgestaaten der Sowjetunion.
Diese Befunde entsprechen teilweise der Theorie der Zivilisationskreise von Huntington.
Abstract
The constitution of a European demos with a collective identity is one of the preconditions
for adjusting the legitimacy problem of the European Union (EU). The analysis attempts to
clarify empirically whether there is sufficient commonality regarding Europeans‘ political
value orientations to substantiate a collective identity. Particularly in view of the European
Union’s eastward enlargement, the question arises whether widespread cultural
heterogeneity in Europe allows the formation of a European demos at all. In Europe we can
identify a West-East axis of political value orientations. Democratic attitudes decrease the
further to the East while at the same time there is an increase in etatist orientations.
Thresholds can be observed which distinguish western European countries on the one hand
and central and eastern European countries on the other. Within the group of central and
eastern Europe a further distinction can be made between the three Slavic republics of the
former Soviet Union and the rest of the countries. These findings support Huntington‘s
theory of civilizations.

Dieter Fuchs and Hans-Dieter Klingemann
Eastward Enlargement of the European Union and the Identity of
Europe*
1. The Issue
Until the Maastricht Treaties (1991), the European Community was primarily an economic
community legitimated by economic efficiency criteria (Lepsius 1999). Maastricht, how-
ever, initiated the transformation of the Community into a European Union (EU), which
continued with the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997). These treaties vest greater powers in EU
institutions. The EU is thus increasingly a supranational regime, substantially restricting
member states’ scope for action, and whose decisions directly affect citizens’ lives. These
decisions also affect politically sensitive areas that had hitherto been dealt with at the na-
tion-state level (including social and moral issues). These developments have been politi-
cising the EU and, consequently, engendering legitimation problems. The discussion on the
democratic deficiencies of the EU, which has arisen only since this transformation of the
European Community, is an expression of the legitimation issue. Many feel the EU can
attain democratic legitimacy only if a European demos with a collective identity takes
shape (Grimm 1995; Kielmansegg 1996; Scharpf 1999). This can be maintained even if the
democratic deficiencies of the EU were to be eliminated institutionally by substantially
expanding the rights of the European Parliament. A viable European democracy requires a
European demos that conceives of itself as a collectivity, considers itself represented by the
Parliament, and makes the latter the addressee of relevant demands. However, in view of
the cultural plurality and heterogeneity of European nation states, it is doubtful whether the
constitution of a European demos with a tenable collective identity is possible at all
(Lepsius 1999).
A further transformation of the EU must increase these doubts. At the 1992 Copenhagen
summit, the then EU heads of government decided that the countries of Central and East-
ern Europe could become members of the EU if they so desired and if they meet certain
criteria for accession. There are now a number of candidates for accession, and negotia-
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2tions are being conducted with a first group of countries. For a number of reasons, east-
ward enlargement is likely to make it even more difficult to develop a European identity.
First, because the territorial limits of Europe are vague: where does it end in the east, or
where should it end? A clearly defined territory is at least a useful, indeed necessary pre-
condition for the cognitive constitution of an “us” that distinguishes itself from “others”
and which is the vehicle of a collective identity (Fuchs, Gerhards, and Roller 1993). Sec-
ond, including additional nation- states increases the cultural plurality of the EU still more.
And, third, it cannot be excluded that, over and above this pluralisation, there is a cultural
gap between Western Europe and Central and Eastern Europe. Such a gap can be caused
by different traditions and historical events in the distant past but also by socialisation and
experience in the opposing societal systems in which people in Eastern and Western
Europe lived from the end of the Second World War until the collapse of the communist
states.
A collective identity can develop only on the basis of commonality among the members
of a definable community. It is an open question how comprehensive this commonality
must and can be in the case of a European demos. We assume that homogenising the plu-
rality of national cultures to form a European nation is a project that is neither practicable
nor useful. For a European demos before which the EU regime can be legitimated and
which participates in the democratic processes in Europe, common political values and
behaviours are presumably quite sufficient. With this premise in mind, our empirical goal
is to establish the extent to which such commonality exists in individual countries or
whether there are serious and systematic differences.
This analysis is structured by two theoretical considerations. First, we assume that politi-
cal value orientations and behaviours can be organised in meaningful patterns. In deter-
mining these patterns we draw on the concepts of the democratic community and various
types of democratic community. The most important criterion is support for democratic
rule and rejection of autocratic rule. The greatest possible agreement on these preferences
is a necessary condition for a European demos. However, fundamental support for democ-
racy reveals nothing about the ideas held on how democracy should be specifically imple-
mented and structured. To settle this question, further values and behaviours must be taken
into account. They form specific patterns, and, with reference to the democratic theory
debate, we distinguish different types of democratic community.
Second, our analysis of differences in political values and behaviours considers not only
individual countries but groups or families of countries. The country groups are distin-
guished on the basis of criteria proposed by Huntington (1996), Lipset (2000) and
Reisinger (1999).
3The planned analysis can contribute only to discovering the potential for the formation
of a European demos with a collective identity. Empirically established, objective com-
monality can have an identity-forming effect only if it is perceived as such and finds its
place in the self-description of the collectivity. However, this transformation of objective
commonality into the subjective self-understanding of a collectivity presupposes a great
deal. In the case of a European demos, one of the prerequisites is certainly a European
public (Gerhards 1993) that can make latent commonality visible and allow it to become
part of people’s self-conception. However, this is not the subject of our study. We limit
ourselves to the priority investigation of whether there is such commonality at all.
The study proceeds in three steps. First, the concepts of democratic community and
types of democratic community are presented. The empirical analysis follows. It begins by
explicating the classification of countries and by stating a number of theoretical expecta-
tions. In the empirical analysis itself, we first establish the extent to which the societal
community in individual countries and groups of countries can be considered democratic at
all. We then determine what type of democratic community predominates in these coun-
tries and groups of countries. In a third and final step, we summarise the empirical findings
and draw a number of conclusions on the formation of a European demos with a collective
identity.
2. The Concept of the Democratic Community
The demos of a democracy is a certain form of societal community. And like every societal
community it is constituted through two mechanisms (Fuchs 1999b, 2000). First, by
drawing a boundary that defines who is included and who is excluded. In modern socie-
ties, nationality provides a formal boundary. But it can have a constitutive effect only if it
is subjectively assimilated by members of the community. This requires cognitively identi-
fiable criteria, and one important such criterion is a clear territorial boundary. Second, a
societal community takes shape through the ties between members on the basis of things
actually or presumed to be shared. Only through these two mechanisms does a mere aggre-
gate of individuals become a community that presents and can describe itself as such, and
with which members can also identify.
The form of societal community that interests us is the demos, which, as the subject of a
democratic form of government, should be a democratic community (Berry 1989;
Chapman and Shapiro 1993). If it is to be accepted as such, it has to exhibit certain mini-
mal characteristics. The institutional order of a democracy (kratos) can function only if
there is a corresponding community (demos). In determining the properties of a democratic
4community we draw on an analytical model that divides democracy into three hierarchi-
cally structured levels (Fuchs and Roller 1998; Fuchs 1999a, 2000). The topmost level is
that of political culture, whose constitutive elements are the fundamental values of a
democracy. The next level is that of political structure, which consists of the democratic
system of government of a country, generally laid down by the constitution. This structure
can be understood as a selective implementation of the cultural values of a community for
the action context of politics, and this system of government is also legitimated by recourse
to these values. The lowest level in the hierarchy is that of the political process. The politi-
cal process is concerned with the realisation of the collective goals of a community by the
actors. Their action is controlled by the political structure, and this means, among other
things, that normative expectations about the behaviour of political actors are associated
with the constituted system of government in a given country. The three levels thus form a
control hierarchy that begins with culture and ends with the process or actual activity on
the part of actors. What attributes must a community have at these three levels if it is to be
deemed democratic?
At the cultural level, a democratic community is characterised above all by support for
the fundamental values of democracy. They include the idea of self-government or sover-
eignty of the people. And this includes mutual recognition of citizens as free and politically
equal. Since the birth of democracy in ancient Athens, the two values freedom and political
equality have been essentially bound up with that of democracy (Sartori 1987; Hansen
1991).
A democratic community cannot be as clearly identified at the structural level as at the
cultural level. On the one hand it must be expected that the regime in the citizens’ own
country is supported in so far as it is a democracy and not an autocracy. Otherwise
approval of the idea of democracy would be completely non-committal. On the other hand,
the idea of a democracy can be institutionally embodied in different ways. For this reason
many people may basically want a democracy but not in the form that exists in their coun-
try. People may therefore support or criticise the democracy implemented in their country
for a variety of reasons (Fuchs 2000). They may support it because it is a democracy and as
such has institutionalised the idea of democracy. They may criticise it because they feel
that the reality of democracy in their country fails to meet their own normative ideas of
democracy, and because they also assume there are alternative forms of implementation
that produce a better democratic reality. Such people can be described as “critical demo-
crats” (Klingemann 1999). Both possibilities are compatible with the prerequisites for a
democratic community.
The process level is concerned with the realisation of political objectives by producing
collectively binding decisions. In pluralistic societies, such goals are always controversial,
5and conflicts about them are the very essence of democratic processes. A democratic
community is thus not characterised by consensus, however understood, about the political
goals to be attained but only by actual compliance with the procedural norms for taking
action as laid down by the constitution, and which are intended to regulate everyday politi-
cal conflicts.
Figure 1: Operational Definitions of a Democratic Community
System level Basic elements Operational definitions
Culture Values
The stronger support is for a democracy and the more
strongly autocracy is rejected, the more closely the
societal community will correspond to a democratic
community.
The more strongly other citizens are recognised as free
and equal, the more closely the societal community will
correspond to a democratic community.
Structure Rules andinstitutions
The stronger support for or critique of democracy in one's
own country is based on democratic norms, the more
closely the societal community will correspond to a
democratic community.
Process Actions
The less citizens use force as a political means, the more
closely the societal community will correspond to a
democratic community.
The more closely citizens conform to the democratically
determined norms of action, the more closely the societal
community will correspond to a democratic community.
Figure 1 shows these attributes of a democratic community in the form of “the more – the
more” statements. They constitute operational definitions that provide a point of reference
for later empirical analysis. As we have seen, a democratic community is characterised at
the process level by compliance with the democratically established legal norms. The pro-
hibition of violence or force as a political instrument has pre-eminent status among these
legal norms, because it affects the essence of successful integration into a community. The
figure therefore contains an independent operational definition of force as a means of poli-
tics.
Having established the characteristics of a democratic community, we proceed to differ-
entiate different types. For the purpose of our study we combine a theoretical with a prag-
matic approach. Theoretically, we follow the contemporary discussion in political philoso-
phy (including Nozick 1974; Barber 1984; Taylor 1989; Etzioni 1993; Rawls 1993), and
pragmatically we are guided by indicators available in the 1995-1999 World Values Sur-
6vey. We begin with a simplified description of the types. We bring in a dimension at the
cultural level that has hitherto been neglected by empirical democracy research, namely the
ethos of a community. It has two points of reference, first, the ethical values by which a
person orders his life and, second, the ethical values governing relations with other mem-
bers of the societal community.
This ethos of the community is the subject of one of the most important democracy the-
ory debates to have been conducted in recent decades. We will not deal with it in detail at
this point but merely reiterate the aspects that are important for our analysis − the differen-
tiation of the democratic community. The debate has been provoked by the tension
between the freedom of individuals and the demands of the community. Differing norma-
tive positions are apparent primarily in the priority given to the one or the other. This
general continuum, with the poles individualism and community, can be divided into two
dimensions, which have already been mentioned in discussing the ethos of the community.
The one dimension addresses the fundamental question who bears the principal responsi-
bility for shaping and determining a person’s life: the individual himself or the state, which
represents a specific form of community institutionalisation. The other dimension is con-
cerned with the just as fundamental question of how relations between individuals should
be. The one alternative is performance-driven competition between individuals in the vari-
ous marketplaces and the other is co-operation and solidarity in dealing with one another
(Chapman and Shapiro 1993). Crossing these two dichotomous dimensions produces a
typology with four normative models of democracy and the corresponding types of demo-
cratic community: libertarian, liberal, socialist, and republican (see Figure 2).
The contrasting and, as it were, pure models are the libertarian and socialist communi-
ties. On both dimensions they give clearest priority to one or other alternative. The liberal
model differs from the libertarian primarily through equality of opportunity in competition
between individuals in the economic and political markets as a criterion of justice. And
justice is the most important standard by which to evaluate societal institutions. The most
prominent advocate of this model is Rawls (1993). Given differences in ability and tem-
perament, equality of opportunity can be ensured only through legal regulation and redis-
tribution by government. Government thus plays an extremely important role in shaping
the life of the individual. The liberal model differs from the socialist model in three ways.
First, redistribution by government is concerned only with the most equal possible distri-
bution of the primary goods that are absolutely necessary for the individual to organise his
life autonomously. Second, the principles of competition and performance are constitutive
for the relationship between individuals in everyday interaction in the marketplace, in
politics, and in other areas of society. And, third, in the event of conflict, individual free-
dom always has unrestricted priority over the equal distribution of the other primary goods.
7Figure 2: Types of a Democratic Community
Responsibility for one’s own fate
Self State
Competition Libertarian Liberal
Relationship
with others
Co-operation
(Solidarity) Republican Socialist
Among other things, this means that, in contrast to the socialist model, basic social rights
ought not to be included in the constitution. Ensuring equality of opportunity can be only a
political task, which, in practical terms, results in the establishment of a more or less com-
prehensive welfare state. Overall, the role of government in the liberal model is thus rela-
tively less restricted than in the socialist model. This difference is not visible in the
dichotomised typology. From an institutional point of view, the ethical values of the
libertarian community mean as little government as possible and as comprehensive a mar-
ket as possible; and those of the socialist community mean a comprehensive welfare state
and a limited market. The liberal community occupies an intermediate position.
The republican community differs most strongly from the others. Moreover, it can be
considered the normatively most demanding. In contrast to the liberal community, com-
mon values are of crucial importance, and, in case of doubt, are given priority over the
unrestricted freedom of the individual. The lifestyle of a republican community is “essen-
tially co-operative and solidaristic” (Post 1993). It differs from the liberal and especially
from the socialist community by a fundamentally anti-etatist and anti-paternalism attitude.
In this regard it resembles the libertarian community. According to republican ideas, com-
munity values should by implemented not by government, and thus on behalf of the citi-
zens, but by the community of citizens themselves (Etzioni 1996). For this reason the self-
organisation of the citizenry in local units is an essential republican postulate. The
republican community is thus a participatory and solidary community. The solidarity con-
cept differs considerably from that upheld in the socialist community. It presents itself as
voluntary support for people in need through no fault of their own, or as voluntary charita-
bleness. Solidarity in a socialist community, by contrast, is exercised through collectively
binding decisions by the state and, moreover, is characterised by a strong concept of
equality.
8Figure 3: Types of a Democratic Community (schematic description)
Libertarian Liberal Socialist Republican
Cultural level
Responsibility
for one's own life Self
Self
+
State
State Self
Relationship
with others Competition
Competition
+
Equal
opportunities
Solidarity
(abstract)
Solidarity
(specific)
Trust
Ethic idea of the
good Tolerance Tolerance
Structural level
Ownership of
means of
production
Private
ownership
Private
ownership
Private
ownership
+
State property
Management of
enterprises Entrepreneur
Entrepreneur
+
Employee
Process level
Political
motivation High
Civic
engagement
(voluntary
associations)
High
The ideas about a republican community that were developed in the context of normative
democracy theory have been taken up in an empirical research context especially by
Putnam (1993). Putnam himself uses the concept of civic community. The dimensions and
attributes of the civic community are compatible with our analytical distinctions. Putnam
assumes from the outset that the civic community is democratic, and accordingly exhibits
corresponding attitudes towards the democratic system of government. He therefore con-
centrates on the ethos of the community and the behaviour of its members that it engen-
ders. At the level of political culture, Putnam sees several values as characteristic of the
community. In the first place he emphasises political equality, while stressing − fully in
keeping with the republican tradition − that this includes equal rights and duties for all.
This value is particularly important for the relationship between individual members of the
community and its institutions. The other values are concerned with interactions among
9members of the community. They should be guided by solidarity, tolerance, and trust. The
citizens of a civic community are thus explicitly not egoistic-rational people, as is
assumed, for example, in the libertarian model of democracy. A decisive characteristic of a
civic community is, according to Putnam, a strong commitment among citizens to political
participation. Putnam makes two specifications in this regard. First, an orientation towards
the public good: “Participation in a civic community is more public-spirited, more oriented
to shared benefits” (Putnam 1993: 88). On the other hand, the decisive form of participa-
tion is in voluntary associations. According to Putnam, active membership in voluntary
associations contributes to the generation of the values mentioned and the associated abil-
ity and willingness for co-operative behaviour in realising the public good.
Figure 3 shows the four types of democratic community schematically in terms of the
attributes described above. The two dimensions underlying the typology in Figure 2 have
naturally been taken into account. A characteristic is used in describing a type of demo-
cratic community only if this is clearly justified on the basis of the democracy theory dis-
cussion.
3. Empirical Analysis
3.1 Classification of Countries and Theoretical Expectations
As the predecessor of the European Union, the European Community came into being
during the period of the East-West conflict. It therefore included only Western European
states, with France and Germany as the core countries. They provided relative economic
and cultural homogeneity, and the border question did not arise. To the west, north, and
south, the border was defined by the coastline, and to the east by the Iron Curtain. After the
collapse of communism, the eastward border dissolved, and the question where the eastern
bounds of Europe ought to be set and who should be considered potential members of the
EU came onto the agenda (Huntington 1996).
Depending on what criteria are applied, this question finds a variety of answers. The
criterion of our study is the similarity of political communities in the countries of Central
and Eastern Europe to those of the Western European countries that have hitherto consti-
tuted the European Union. The basic assumption is that the potential for the formation of
the European demos with a collective identity is proportionate to the similarity of political
values and behaviours. Before we tackle the empirical analysis, we classify the countries
under study and attempt on this basis to formulate what we expect of the analysis.
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Political values and behaviours are influenced by various factors; most importantly, per-
haps, by durable cultural traditions (Putnam 1993, Huntington 1996, Inglehart 1998). A
useful starting point for classifying countries is thus the distinction between civilisations
drawn by Huntington (1996). He postulates a historical cultural borderline within Europe
that divides the Western-Christian peoples from the Muslim and Orthodox peoples. This
dividing line ultimately goes back to the division of the Roman Empire in the 4th century,
consolidated in the 16th century. If one were to take account only of this cultural border,
the frontier of Europe would be clearly definable. It would run where Western Christianity
ends and Islam begins (Huntington 1996). This definition is based above all on religion,
and this is dichotomised: Protestant and Catholic vs. Orthodox and Muslim. For the pur-
poses of our analysis, this is too great a simplification. We therefore draw on two further
criteria to produce a more differentiated classification of countries, basing our procedure
on democracy theory approaches and findings (Reisinger 1999; Lipset 2000).
These two additional criteria are the different empires in which the peoples concerned
lived for centuries, namely the British, Habsburg, Russian, and Ottoman empires. The links
between these empires and specific religions (Protestant, Catholic, Orthodox, and Muslim)
are obvious, but it can be assumed that the respective system of government has an inde-
pendent impact on fundamental values. They are, for example, to be associated with the
extent of autocratic rule in the different empires or with the different degree of separation
between State and Church.
The Soviet Empire can be regarded as a specific variant. Russia formed the centre of this
empire, and its sphere of influence included first the other Soviet republics, and second the
countries of Central and Eastern Europe within the Iron Curtain. Unlike the other empires,
the Soviet Union and its satellite states had definitely no religious basis. The impact on the
political attitudes and behaviours of the citizenry is affected by the autocratic system of
government and the egalitarian ideology (Fuchs 1999b, Rohrschneider 1999). Reisinger
(1999) suggests that this impact varies depending on the length of time during which a
country had a Leninist regime.
In addition to religion, empire and Leninist regime, we draw on a fourth characteristic,
the level of socio-economic modernity. It is operationalized by per capita GDP. The mod-
ernity and wealth of a country are among the most important preconditions for the forma-
tion and stability of a democracy and for the development of democratic and liberal values.
This has been repeatedly established by Lipset (1959, 1994, 2000), and can be considered
one of the best confirmed findings of empirical democracy research.
Tables 1 and 2 classify countries in terms of the dimensions explained. Description in
terms of “empire” and “modernity” (Table 1) is relatively unproblematic. It is a little more
complicated with “religion”, since most countries are mixed in this respect. Table 2 shows
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the shares of individual religions in each country as a percentage. In the last column (CL)
the country is classified in terms of modal denomination. The columns PC (Protestant and
Catholic) and OM (Orthodox and Muslim) demonstrate the dominant dividing line postu-
lated by Huntington (1996).
Countries have been assigned to one of seven groups on the basis of the four dimensions
(see Tables 1 and 2). Although our study is concerned with European countries, the United
States, Australia, and New Zealand have also been taken into account. According to
Huntington (1996), these countries form an independent culture complex within Western-
Christian civilisation that differs systematically from Europe. This difference has recently
been empirically established at the level of political attitudes and behaviours, as well
(Fuchs and Klingemann 2000). Including this group of countries provides a contrastive
backdrop to the particularity of European nations. Moreover, they most clearly represent
one of the types of democratic community that we have identified (libertarian community).
We have chosen to label the groups of countries by geographical region. Such regions
are relatively neutral concepts, while being, in a certain sense, effective factors in generat-
ing common characteristics. Spatial proximity between countries and peoples facilitates
communication and increases the probability of similar historical experience. All four di-
mensions relate systematically to the formation and stability of democracies on the one
hand, and to the development of democratic and liberal attitudes and behaviours on the
other (Huntington 1996; Reisinger 1999; Lipset 2000).1 Since we cannot make any precise
assumptions about the relative weight of individual dimensions and relations between the
various scale points, only limited a priori assumptions are possible on the basis of this clas-
sification. We begin with the “democratic community”, which is characterised by accep-
tance of the fundamental values of every democracy. In this regard, the situational factor of
the collapse of the communist systems is likely to have an effect. We therefore expect a
democracy to be supported by a majority in every country. The factors we have used in
classifying countries would therefore have to take effect in relative differences between
countries and groups of countries. If the major historical dividing lines postulated by
Huntington (1996), separating the Western-Christian peoples from the Muslim and Ortho-
dox peoples, is indeed the decisive borderline, the Anglo-American, Western European,
Central European, and Baltic countries would be more democratic than the South-Eastern
and Eastern European lands.
If all four dimensions − not only “religion” but also “empire”, “Leninist regime” and
“modernity” − are taken into account, expectations are somewhat more differentiated. On
the basis of these dimensions we can posit the following ordinal sequence in the extent
                                                
1 Religion: 1. Muslim or Orthodox, 2 Catholic, 3 Protestant or secular; Empire: 1 Ottoman or Russian, 2
Hapsburg, 3 British or none; Leninist regime: 1 yes (duration in years), 2 no; modernity: continuous (the
higher the score the more favourable to democracy and vice versa).
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Table 1: Cultural Heritage. A Classification of Countries by Empires, Duration of Leninist
Regimes and Modernity
Countries Empires Modernity
(crude classification) (GDP ppp in US $)
Anglo-American countries
USA British (-) 29.080
Australia British (-) 19.510
New Zealand British (-) 15.780
Western European countries
Norway None (Sweden) (-) 24.260
Sweden None (-) 19.010
Finland Russian (-) 19.660
West Germany None (Prussia) (-) 24.345
Spain None (Spain) (-) 15.690
Central European countries
East Germany None (Prussia)/Le 41 17.995
Czech Republic Habsburg/Le 41 10.380
Slovakia Habsburg/ Le 41 7.860
Hungary Habsburg/ Le 43 6.970
Slovenia Habsburg/ Le 18 11.880
Croatia Habsburg/ Le 18 4.930
Baltic countries
Estonia Russia/ Le 50 5.090
Latvia Russia/ Le 50 3.970
Lithuania Russia/ Le 50 4.140
South-Eastern European countries (mainly Orthodox)
Yugoslavia Ottoman/ Le 18 3.500
Romania Ottoman/ Le 43 4.270
Bulgaria Ottoman/ Le 43 3.870
South-Eastern European countries (mixed-Muslim)
Macedonia Ottoman/ Le 18 3.180
Bosnia-Herzegovina Ottoman/ Le 18 2.358
Albania Ottoman/ Le 45 2.170
Eastern European countries
Russia Russia/ Le 74 4.280
Ukraine Russia/ Le 74 2.170
Belarus Russia/ Le 74 4.820
Moldova Ottoman/ Le 50 1.450
Le = years of Leninist rule (Reisinger 1999 and own calculations for Albania, East Germany; and the former
Yugoslav states; Modernity: GDP purchasing parity power in US dollars 1997.
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Table 2: Cultural Heritage. A Classification of Countries by Denomination
Countries P C PC O M OM S T CL
% % % % % % % %
Anglo-American countries
USA 36 25 61 0 0 1 18 80 P
Australia 48 26 74 1 1 2 3 79 P
New Zealand 60 14 74 0 0 0 4 78 P
Western European countries
Norway 82 1 83 1 1 2 4 89 P
Sweden 81 5 86 1 4 5 1 92 P
Finland 80 3 83 2 0 2 1 86 P
West Germany 39 33 72 0 1 1 1 74 P
Spain 1 82 83 0 0 0 1 84 C
Central European countries
East Germany 18 5 23 0 0 0 1 24 T
Czech Republic 2 39 40 0 0 0 3 43 C
Slovakia 10 73 83 0 0 0 3 86 C
Hungary 17 55 72 2 0 2 1 75 C
Slovenia 2 69 71 2 1 3 1 75 C
Croatia 0 82 82 1 1 1 1 85 C
Baltic countries
Estonia 10 0 10 16 0 16 2 28 T
Latvia 19 18 37 18 0 18 5 60 P
Lithuania 2 77 79 4 0 4 2 85 C
South-Eastern European countries (mainly Orthodox)
Yugoslavia 1 6 7 64 8 72 2 81 O
Romania 2 5 6 87 0 87 3 96 O
Bulgaria 1 1 2 52 12 64 1 67 O
South-Eastern European countries (mixed-Muslim)
Macedonia 0 1 1 45 24 69 0 70 O
Bosnia-
Herzegovina
2 14 16 26 27 53 1 70 M
Albania 0 6 6 20 67 87 0 93 M
Eastern European countries
Russia 0 0 0 48 5 53 1 54 O
Ukraine 0 6 6 56 0 56 1 63 O
Belarus 0 8 8 54 0 54 0 62 O
Moldova 0 0 0 83 0 83 1 84 O
P = Protestant; C = Catholic; PC = sum of Protestant + Catholic; O = Orthodox; M = Muslim; OM = sum of
Orthodox + Muslim; S = Sects; T = proportion of respondents mentioning a denominational affiliation; CL =
generalised denominational classification. Cell entries are data generated by the World Values Survey 1995-
99.
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to which a democratic community exists: (1) the Anglo-American and Western European
countries (perhaps Spain and Finland might be somewhat marginal); (2) the Central Euro-
pean countries; (3) the Baltic countries; (4) the South-Eastern European countries (with the
exception of Albania); (5) the Eastern European countries (including Albania). In all the
following tables of empirical results, the groups of countries are listed in this presumed
order. If one wishes to provide an empirically testable simplification, the extent to which a
democratic community exists in individual countries can be assumed to vary along a
geographical northwest-southeast axis.
Two central criteria were applied in differentiating between types of democratic com-
munity (see Figure 2). First, whom the citizens feel should bear primary responsibility for a
person’s fate (the individual himself or the state), and, second, how relations between fel-
low-citizens ought to be (competitive or solidary). The two criteria can also be understood
as a specification of the more general individualism-collectivism dimension. In formulat-
ing our expectations we drew on a study by Lipset (1996). He postulates a substantial dif-
ference between American and European cultures, an “American exceptionalism”. In this
context he is concerned only with Western Europe. The distinction Lipset makes resembles
that proposed by Huntington (1996) between North American and Western European cul-
tures. However Lipset focuses on different aspects. In his view, the exceptionality of
American culture has been primarily determined by the ethos of the Protestant sects that
immigrated from Britain. Central to the American ethos is a marked individualism with a
strong ethic of self-responsibility and an anti-etatist attitude. This has produced a society
with a weak central government and a strong market. Another two features that character-
ize the American ethos also trace back to the traditions of the Protestant sects (Lipset
1996). On the one hand, this is a pronounced work ethic that derives ultimately from the
idea of "predestination." On the other hand, it is an ethic moralism with respect to ques-
tions of good life and true action.
Lipset contrasts the American ethos with the etatist and solidary attitudes among Euro-
peans, which have led to the formation of welfare states. Of the factors given in Tables 1
and 2 that shape the political attitudes and behaviours of the citizenry, Lipset thus cites
British origins and the tradition of the British Empire, and the religion of the Protestant
sects. However, since the ethic of the Protestant sects and the structure of the political and
economic systems grounded on it are considered the most important causes for the extraor-
dinarily successful modernisation process in the United States, the modernity factor also
comes into play. On the basis of Lipset’s study we can formulate a number of expectations
about the type of democratic community in the countries under study.
Lipset (1996) takes no account of Central and Eastern European countries. If we assume
that autocratic regimes − like those of the Ottoman and Russian Empires and the Soviet
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imperium − foster etatist orientations and weaken individualist attitudes, we can on this
basis formulate expectations about the type of democratic community to include the coun-
tries of Central and Eastern Europe. We restrict ourselves to the two criteria underlying the
typology in Figure 2, on the assumption that, at a more general level, both are based on the
individualism-collectivism (or etatism) dimension. On this dimension at least three types of
democratic community can be placed. The libertarian community is closest to the individu-
alist pole, the socialist community to the collectivism pole, with the liberal community
between the two. If we apply these criteria, the Anglo-American countries can be assumed
to exhibit a tendency towards the libertarian community, Western European countries
towards the liberal community, and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe towards
the socialist community. The latter is likely to apply most strongly for the Slavic successor
countries to the Soviet Union.
3.2 Democratic Community
Two questions are to be settled in the first step of the empirical analysis. First, the extent to
which the societal communities in the countries under study are democratic, and, second,
how marked the similarities or differences between these countries are. The analysis is
guided by the expectations formulated in the previous section.
The criteria for a democratic community have been laid down as operational definitions
(see Figure 1). With the exception of “mutual recognition as free and politically equal citi-
zens”, indicators of all the attributes of a democratic community are contained in the World
Values Survey 1995-1999. The distributions of attitudes and behavioural dispositions
measured by these indicators are shown in Table 3.
We will not interpret the empirical findings shown in Table 3 in any detail.2 They serve
primarily as background information for the following systematic comparison to which we
can refer as needed. Before we tackle this comparison, a few remarks on our methods are
appropriate.
We describe and localise the countries under study by aggregating individual character-
istics of citizens. The advantages and disadvantages of this strategy are well known, and
they have been comprehensively discussed. Our approach differs from most in that we
make a priori assumptions that are theoretically justified. On the one hand we define the
democratic community in general and the types of democratic community on the basis of a
number of specific characteristics. On the other hand, we determine which countries best
                                                
2 The indicators and indices are described in greater detail in Appendix 1.
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Table 3: Empirical Evidence of Citizen Support of a Set of Criteria for a Democratic
Community
Countries Culture Structure Process
DEMa) AUTa) PSC CGI VIO LAW
% % % % % %
Anglo-American countries
USA 88 5 35 27 83 98
Australia 83 6 30 23 85 97
New Zealand 88 3 14 11 87 95
Western European countries
Norway 93 3 67 60 91 97
Sweden 93 5 27 39 88 93
Finland 75 10 34 23 91 94
West Germany 93 1 40 20 85 88
Spain 92 8 31 25 76 97
Central European countries
East Germany 91 2 38 12 85 90
Czech Republic 88 4 33 18 80 86
Slovakia 88 4 36 30 73 82
Hungary 83 5 32 30 80 89
Slovenia 82 6 28 24 70 85
Croatia 95 13 45 38 87 74
Baltic countries
Estonia 85 6 30 36 83 91
Latvia 79 8 24 19 83 83
Lithuania 87 15 29 23 76 90
South-Eastern European countries (mainly Orthodox)
Yugoslavia 88 10 24 29 74 92
Romania 89 22 11 16 77 94
Bulgaria 80 19 36 43 79 96
South-Eastern European countries (mixed-Muslim)
Macedonia 73 15 21 16 79 89
Bosnia-
Herzegovina
87 26 32 57 72 97
Albania 98 65 43 35 93 92
Eastern European countries
Russia 51 20 7 16 82 85
Ukraine 75 17 13 29 78 81
Belarus 75 17 12 26 83 80
Moldova 71 16 14 33 66 82
DEM: Support of democratic rule; AUT: Support of autocratic Rule; PSC: Support of political system of
one's own country; CGI: Confidence in governmental institutions; VIO: Illegitimacy of violence; LAW: Law
abidingness. Cell entries are percent positive support.
a) The addition of both percentage can exceed 100. There are respondents who equally support democratic
and autocratic rules.
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represent the democratic community and its types. These are the benchmark countries of
our analysis. We assume that all respondents can be described and related to the bench-
mark countries through a combination of the properties constitutive to the respective com-
munity. By using discriminant analysis as a statistical technique we are able to answer two
questions. First, how important the specific characteristics (indicators) are in predicting the
membership of a respondent in the predefined group on the one hand and in the undefined
group on the other. Second, for every respondent from the undefined group, the probability
of his belonging to the defined or known group can be determined.
The tables show several figures useful in assessing results. First, correlations of the vari-
ables with the discriminant function: the higher the correlation, the more important is the
variable or the indicator for discriminating between citizens in the known group and those
in the group of other countries. Second, eigenvalues and canonical correlations: both high
eigenvalues and high canonical correlations mean that the two groups are well separated by
the given set of variables. Third, group centroids are reported. These figures are simply
average scores for respondents belonging to each of the predefined groups. Fourth, we
show simplified classification results. Each respondent is allocated to a group according to
his greatest probability − given the set of variables for the prediction. The share of
correctly classified respondents is an indictor of the goodness of fit.
Discriminant analysis allows us to assign a probability of belonging to a group that is
defined a priori to represent a certain theoretical category. We use this capability in our
analysis. Although the initial score is allocated to the individual respondent, we use this
variable in our analysis mainly to describe nation-states by averaging the respective infor-
mation.
The standard against which we determine the extent to which the societal community in
specific countries is democratic is a group of countries that undoubtedly represent such a
community. The countries concerned are, first the United States and Australia, and, sec-
ond, Sweden and West Germany. These are the benchmark democracies for the discrimi-
nant analysis. Table 4 shows how strongly the eight attributes of a democratic community
distinguish between the benchmark democracies and the other countries. With one excep-
tion − “confidence in governmental institutions” − all correlations of the variables with the
discriminant function are statistically significant. The highest correlations are in “support
for autocracy” (-.799) at the cultural level and “law-abidingness” (.583) at the process
level. 60 per cent of respondents were correctly classified on the basis of this weighted
combination of characteristics.
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Table 4: Differentiation Between Benchmark Democracies and Other Countries
Democraciesa)
rb)
Cultural level
Support of democracy .446
Support of autocracy -.799
Structural level
Support for current political system .252
Confidence in gov't institutions .048c)
Process level
Illegitimacy of violence .264
Law abidingness .583
Eigenvalue .059
Canonical correlation .236
Group centroids
Groups to classify -.121
Democracies .486
Classification results
Group
1 2
1 Group to classify .58 .42
2 Democracies .32 .68
Correctly classified 60
a) Benchmark countries: USA, Australia, Sweden and West Germany
b) Pooled within-group correlations between discriminating variables and canonical discriminant function.
c) Not significant at the .001 level.
However, our analysis is concerned with the categorisation and comparison of countries
and groups of countries. For this purpose we have aggregated the results obtained at the
individual level. Table 5 shows the mean of probability for respondents in a country to
belong to the group of benchmark democracies as defined by the characteristics stated in
Table 4. Countries are classified in terms of the geographical groups explained in the
theoretical section. The name of each geographical group is given in italics over the
countries, and the mean and standard deviations for these groups are also stated. The
expectation formulated in the theoretical section relative to the geographical country
groups postulates the following ordinal sequence in degrees of democratic community: (1)
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the Anglo-American and Western European countries; (2) the Central European countries;
(3) the Baltic countries; (4) the South-Eastern European countries; (5) the Eastern
European countries.
This assumption is essentially confirmed by empirical findings. The deviant group is the
Baltic nations, which rank after the Orthodox South-Eastern European countries. However,
the results for individual Baltic countries differ greatly. Whilst the mean for Estonia corre-
sponds more or less to that for Slovenia and Croatia in Central Europe, Latvia and Lithua-
nia trail behind the South-Eastern European Muslim countries. Estonia’s distinctiveness
can be attributed to the country’s greater modernity in comparison with the other two Bal-
tic nations (see Table 1) and to the high proportion of the population − in comparison with
all the countries under study − with no religious ties (see Table 2).
By far the greatest misclassification of a country in a geographical group is Albania. Of
all countries, Albania shows the lowest mean and thus the greatest distance to the bench-
mark democracies. The result cannot be explained with reference to the country classifica-
tion criteria. Possibly the regime of Enver Hodscha plays a role, certainly one of the most
totalitarian among comparable regimes in Europe.
As we expected, the Slavic successor countries to the Soviet Union, here termed Eastern
European countries, show by far the lowest mean score of all regional groups (see Table
5). They thus correspond least to the benchmark democracies. However, a majority in
Moldova, Belarus, and Ukraine also clearly favours democracy, while only a minority is in
favour of autocracy (see Table 3). Relative distance from the benchmark democracies thus
does not necessarily mean that the citizens of the country concerned do not form a demo-
cratic community. The relatively least support for democracy (51 per cent) and a relatively
high support for autocracy (20 per cent) among Eastern European countries is to be found
in Russia. Of all the countries under study, Russia, together with Albania, has the lowest
mean score. These two countries are accordingly the least democratic as far as the attitudes
and behaviours of their citizens are concerned.
Among the Anglo-American and Western European countries, two deviate relatively
strongly from the others: Spain and, above all, Finland (see Table 5). In the case of Spain
this is attributable above all to the below average rejection of violence as a political
instrument, and in the case of Finland to the below average support for democracy (see
Table 3). The explanation ex-post factum may be the tradition of violent confrontation in
Spain and the geographical proximity and former dominance of Finland to Russia and the
Soviet Union. Finland is the only country in Western Europe that belonged to an autocratic
empire (Russia) for a longer period. These two deviant cases also explain most of the
difference in the mean between the Anglo-American countries and the countries of
Western Europe.
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Table 5: Closeness of Countries to the Benchmark Democracies
Countries Meana) Sda) Na)
Anglo-American countries .552 (.118) 3,749
USAb) .562 (.12) 1,235
Australiab) .538 (.12) 1,726
New Zealand .565 (.11) 788
Western European countries .536 (.123) 4,494
Norway  .579 (.11) 1,077
Swedenb)  .530 (.12) 862
Finland  .493 (.13) 796
West Germanyb)  .551 (.11) 896
Spain  .511 (.12) 863
Central European countries .497 (.135) 4,980
East Germany  .539 (.12) 888
Czech Republic  .512 (.13) 935
Slovakia  .482 (.13) 868
Hungary  .512 (.13) 494
Slovenia  .486 (.14) 807
Croatia  .460 (.14) 988
Baltic countries .436 (.131) 2,168
Estonia  .477 (.13) 782
Latvia  .418 (.12) 894
Lithuania  .403 (.12) 492
South-Eastern European countries (mainly
Orthodox)
.468 (.135) 2,382
Yugoslavia  .494 (.13) 1,013
Romania  .453 (.14) 804
Bulgaria  .444 (.12) 565
South-Eastern European countries (mixed-
Muslim)
.405 (.133) 2,091
Macedonia  .429 (.12) 589
Bosnia-Herzegovina  .436 (.13) 966
Albania  .322 (.10) 536
Eastern European countries .374 (.127) 3,796
Russia  .362 (.13) 1,011
Ukraine  .380 (.13) 1,008
Belarus  .382 (.12) 1,054
Moldova  .373 (.13) 723
Total  .477 (.12) 23,660
Eta2  .228
a) Mean = Mean membership probability of respondents belonging to the group of benchmark democracies,
defined by the set of eight characteristics of democratic community; Sd = Standard deviation; N =
Number of cases.
b) Benchmark democracies.
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For the further analysis of the democratic community we made two simplifications in
comparison with the discriminant analysis. First, we restricted ourselves to the three char-
acteristics: “support of democracy”, “support of autocracy”, and “law-abidingness”. We
thus leave out attitudes to the political system in the respondents’ own country, the theo-
retical status of which is not fully clear (see section 2). The three attributes taken into
account, are, however, also those that most clearly distinguish the group of benchmark
democracies from the group of other countries (see Table 4). Second, we make no a priori
assumption in the form of a reference group (benchmark democracies). We localise the
countries in a two-dimensional space (see Figure 4). The one dimension is the proportion
of respondents that clearly support democracy while rejecting autocracy. These respon-
dents are termed “solid democrats” (Klingemann 1999). The second dimension is the pro-
portion of respondents that exhibit differing degrees of law-abidingness.
The countries are relatively widely scattered in the two-dimensional space. Although
there is a significant linear relationship between the two dimensions, it is not very marked
(R² = .12). Nevertheless, certain patterns can be identified that correspond to the results of
the discriminant analysis. Countries with a pronounced democratic community are located
in the top right-hand area of the space, the Anglo-American countries and some Western
European countries. Of the Western European countries, Spain and West Germany deviate
most. Finland and Spain exhibit above average law-abidingness and an only average pro-
portion of solid democrats. With West Germany exactly the opposite applies.
The left-hand bottom part of the space is occupied by countries whose societal commu-
nity can be described as least democratic. Here we find the same countries that scored low-
est in the discriminant analysis: the Eastern European countries and Albania. Combining
dear support for democracy and rejection of democracy produces an even more marked
result. In all five countries (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Albania) solid democrats
are a minority of less than 25 per cent. At the same time, the level of law-abidingness is
below average. The Central European countries (Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary),
although spatially somewhat apart from the North American and Western European coun-
tries, are still much closer to them than to the Eastern European countries and Albania.
This finding, too, conforms to the discriminant analysis.
Figure 4: Location of Countries in a Two-Dimensional Space of Democratic Community
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(a) Percentage of people with high degree of law abidingness (see Appendix 1); (b) Percentage of people who support democratic rule and at the same time reject autocratic rule.
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3.3 Types of Democratic Community
A democratic community is characterised by its members exhibiting attitudes and
behaviours that meet the minimum demands of a democracy. However, a democracy can
be differently realised and structured. Citizens can have differing normative ideas about
this. On the basis of the democracy theory discussion, we have distinguished four
normative models of democracy and the corresponding four types of democratic
community (see Figure 2). Having in the preceding section empirically analysed the
similarities and differences between countries with regard to the democratic community,
we proceed in this section to do the same for the types of democratic community.
In Figure 3 the four types of democratic community are described in terms of
characteristics that are theoretically relevant and for which indicators are available in the
World Values Survey 1995-1999. The distributions of the specific attitudes and behaviours
are shown in Tables 6.1 and 6.2. The detailed description of the indicators and indices is to
be found in the Appendix 2. In this case, too, we will not deal with the distributions in
detail but turn directly to the comparison between countries.
In this comparison we proceed as with the democratic community. The statistical
method used is discriminant analysis, and we define benchmark countries as the point of
reference for classifying individual countries. As explained in the theoretical section 2, our
definition of benchmark democracies draws primarily on the study by Lipset (1996) and a
follow-up empirical analysis (Fuchs and Klingemann 2000). According to these studies,
the United States is to be considered a libertarian democracy with republican elements. For
the sake of simplicity, we take recourse in Table 7 and the following tables and figures
only to the characterisation as libertarian democracy. Australia has structural properties
similar to those of the United States (see Tables 1 and 2) and exhibits similar political
attitudes and behaviours. In our analysis, Australia − in addition to the United States −
therefore represents the libertarian type of democracy, and the two countries form the
corresponding benchmark group.
In contrast to the individualism of the United States, Western European countries have a
pronounced etatist tradition. This was realised in the development of welfare states, whose
functions include ensuring the greatest possible equality of opportunity for individuals
competing in the markets. These welfare states correspond to the liberal model of
democracy, and a societal community with the relevant attitudes and behaviours is
therefore to be termed a liberal community. The benchmark countries we have chosen to
represent this liberal type of community are Sweden and West Germany. Both are
indubitably welfare states, but they have developed different forms (Roller 2000). By
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taking these two countries into account, the relevant spectrum of Western European
welfare states and thus of Western European liberal democracies has been covered.
Table 6.1: Citizen Support of Different Types of Democratic Community at Cultural
Level
Countries Culture
SRE SOL TRU WET ETO
% % % % %
Anglo-American countries
USA 66 21 35 68 9
Australia 47 29 40 61 18
New Zealand 45 34 47 61 21
Western European countries
Norway 37 19 65 42 22
Sweden 67 49 57 49 40
Finland 42 41 48 57 20
West Germany 41 75 40 25 45
Spain 24 67 29 55 23
Central European countries
East Germany 19 86 24 33 35
Poland 36 61 17 32 5
Czech Republic 23 51 27 43 30
Slovak Republic 14 52 26 45 17
Hungary 12 82 22 43 13
Slovenia 24 53 15 58 20
Croatia 11 62 23 54 22
Baltic countries
Estonia 16 56 21 57 5
Latvia 17 66 24 52 8
Lithuania 24 74 21 33 3
South-Eastern European countries (mainly Orthodox)
Yugoslavia 16 65 29 45 4
Romania 31 63 18 63 6
Bulgaria 22 71 24 52 14
South-Eastern European countries (mixed-Muslim)
Macedonia 16 74 7 35 2
Bosnia-Herzegovina 17 59 27 60 3
Albania 14 62 24 88 2
Eastern European countries
Russia 16 79 23 48 3
Ukraine 14 76 29 43 3
Belarus 17 70 23 52 4
Moldova 14 75 22 54 3
SRE: Self-responsibility; SOL: Solidarity; TRU: Trust in others; WET: Work ethic; ETO: Ethic tolerance.
Cell entries are percent positive support (for details compare Appendix 2).
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Table 6.2: Citizen Support for Different Types of Democratic Community at Structural
and Process Levels
Countries Structure Process
PRO MAN PMO CIV
% % % %
Anglo-American countries
USA 74 55 52 52
Australia 62 51 45 45
New Zealand 52 64 41 35
Western European countries
Norway 46 34 43 25
Sweden 48 36 41 24
Finland 59 35 17 12
West Germany 61 30 55 25
Spain 34 37 17 13
Central European countries
East Germany 37 29 47 16
Poland 31 15 27 0
Czech Republic 38 42 27 7
Slovak Republic 23 21 28 6
Hungary 40 24 24 9
Slovenia 49 22 14 8
Croatia 75 34 24 13
Baltic countries
Estonia 33 40 26 3
Latvia 36 37 25 5
Lithuania 47 38 25 2
South-Eastern European countries (mainly Orthodox)
Yugoslavia 42 25 21 4
Romania 55 37 21 9
Bulgaria 40 27 23 2
South-Eastern European countries (mixed-Muslim)
Macedonia 58 37 21 8
Bosnia-Herzegovina 49 25 37 20
Albania 78 48 19 7
Eastern European countries
Russia 14 16 23 3
Ukraine 32 23 25 1
Belarus 25 20 38 1
Moldova 20 23 23 5
PRO: Private ownership; MAN: Management of enterprise; PMO: Political motivation; CIV: Civic engage-
ment.
Cell entries are percent positive support (for details compare Appendix 2).
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The correlations of the indicators of the discriminant function in Table 7 show how
strongly the individual characteristics distinguish between the benchmark countries and the
other countries. In the case of libertarian democracy, the highest correlations are for “self-
responsibility” and “solidarity with the disadvantaged”, as well as “civic engagement”. The
first two characteristics are also those with which a libertarian democracy can most
strongly be identified in accordance with our theoretical assumption (see Figures 2 and 3),
and “civic engagement” is typical of republican democracies (see Figure 3). For liberal
democracy, the highest correlations are for “self-responsibility” and “ethic tolerance”.
Table 7: Differentiation Between Benchmark Types of Democracies and Other Countries
Type of democracy
Libertarian democracya) Liberal democracyb)
rc) rc)
Cultural level
Self-responsibility .464 .513
Solidarity with the disadvantaged -.504 .095
Trust in others .114 .333
Work ethic .178 -.226
Ethic tolerance .012 .722
Structural level
Private ownership .354 .182
Management of enterprise (owners) .286 -.035
Process level
Political motivation .232 .318
Civic engagement .786 .291
Eigenvalue .294 .096
Canonical correlation .476 .296
Group centroids
Group to classify -.193 -.075
Liberal democracies 1.522 1.274
Classification results
Group Group
1 2 1 2
1 Group to classify 84 16 76 24
2 Liberal democracies 30 70 23 77
Correctly classified 82 76
Benchmark countries: a) United States and Australia; b) Sweden and West Germany.
c) Pooled within-group correlations between discriminating variables and canonical discriminant functions.
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These characteristics, too, are to be found in the description of the liberal community in
Figure 3. The proportion of correctly classified respondents is much higher for these two
types of democratic community than for the democratic community in general. For
“libertarian democracy” the figure is 82 per cent, and for “liberal democracy” 76 per cent.
This indicates that the difference between the reference group and the group of other
countries is relatively large. We will be dealing with this in greater detail.
The socialist community has not been included in the comparative analysis. The reason
is a simple one: there is no Western country that can plausibly represent this type of
community. There is also no Western country that represents the republican community in
a “pure” form. However, the United States and Australia also exhibit some republican
properties. Although the benchmark group composed by these two countries
predominantly represents a libertarian community, it has additional attributes.
In contrast to the democratic community in general, there are considerable differences
between countries with regard to the type of democratic community. We will deal first
with the libertarian community. Three gaps are identifiable between groups of countries
(see Table 8). The first is between the Anglo-American and the Western European
countries. For the first the mean is .656 and for the second .376. Since the Western
European countries still have the highest mean of the European groups, the difference
between Anglo-America and Europe posited by Lipset (1996) is impressively confirmed.
Within the European countries, however, there are still substantial differences. The next
gap in mean ranking is between Western European countries (.376) and Muslim South-
Eastern countries (.282). Right at the end of the scale come the Baltic and Eastern
European countries. The mean for both groups of countries is lower than .200. The
democratic communities in Europe can thus definitively not be considered libertarian but at
least liberal (Western European countries), if not even socialist. There are some striking
deviations within groups of countries. Among Western European countries Spain and
among Central European countries Hungary have a markedly lower mean than the other
countries in their groups. And among the Muslim South-Eastern European countries,
Bosnia-Herzegovina has by far the highest mean. This relatively greater proximity of
Bosnia-Herzegovina to the benchmark democracies is, however, attributable less to the
libertarian characteristics of the two countries that constitute the group than to the
communitarian attribute of moral rigorism (see Table 6.1).
As the correlations of the liberal community characteristics with the discriminant
function show (see Table 7), “self-responsibility” (.513) and especially “ethic tolerance”
(.722) distinguish most clearly between the benchmark countries and the others. By the
first (self-responsibility), a liberal community distinguishes itself above all from a socialist
community. Thus, the results of the discriminant analysis do not inevitably fit the
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Table 8: Closeness of Countries to Liberal and Libertarian Types of Democracy
Countries Libertarian democracya) Liberal democracyb)
Meanc) Sdc) Nc) Meanc) Sdc) Nc)
Anglo-American
countries .656 (.30) 3,122 .449 (.26) 3,122
USA .752 (.27) 1,016 .426 (.26) 1,016
Australia .621 (.31) 1,528 .455 (.27) 1,528
New Zealand .580 (.29) 578 .473 (.25) 578
Western European
countries .376 (.28) 3,652 .524 (.27) 3,652
Norway .470 (.28) 970 .494 (.24) 970
Sweden .431 (.28) 662 .682 (.21) 662
Finland .334 (.26) 708 .424 (.24) 708
West Germany .360 (.29) 604 .657 (.26) 604
Spain .251 (.25) 708 .406 (.27) 708
Central European
countries .240 (.24) 4,317 .380 (.25) 4,317
East Germany .224 (.23) 687 .505 (.28) 687
Czech Republic .263 (.24) 794 .413 (.23) 794
Slovakia .199 (.20) 834 .331 (.22) 834
Hungary .184 (.20) 467 .340 (.23) 467
Slovenia .277 (.25) 731 .330 (.24) 731
Croatia .274 (.25) 804 .360 (.24) 804
Baltic countries .191 (.20) 2,227 .268 (.19) 2,227
Estonia .200 (.20) 761 .247 (.18) 761
Latvia .192 (.20) 844 .290 (.19) 844
Lithuania .179 (.18) 622 .262 (.19) 622
South-Eastern
European countries
(mainly Orthodox) .225 (.22) 2,380 .289 (.22) 2,380
Yugoslavia .180 (.19) 1,073 .252 (.20) 1,073
Romania .305 (.25) 819 .296 (.22) 819
Bulgaria .189 (.19) 488 .358 (.23) 488
South-Eastern
European countries
(mixed-Muslim) .282 (.26) 2,193 .254 (.19) 2,193
Macedonia .223 (.22) 627 .240 (.18) 627
Bosnia-Herzegovina .321 (.29) 917 .267 (.19) 917
Albania .287 (.29) 649 .249 (.17) 649
Eastern European
countries .143 (.16) 4,719 .247 (.19) 4,719
Russia .136 (.16) 1,294 .251 (.25) 1,294
Ukraine .134 (.14) 1,381 .256 (.20) 1,381
Belarus .146 (.15) 1,255 .264 (.19) 1,255
Moldova .168 (.20) 789 .197 (.17) 789
Total .297 (.23) 22,610 .352 (.22) 22,610
Eta2 .22 - - .09 - -
a) Libertarian democracy: benchmark countries USA and Australia.
b) Liberal democracy: benchmark countries Sweden and West Germany.
c) Mean = Mean membership probability of respondents belonging to the group of benchmark democracies, defined by
the set of nine characteristics; Sd = Standard deviation; N = Number of cases.
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libertarian-liberal-socialist continuum. In the liberal community, too, there are very clear
differences between groups of countries. Also in keeping with theoretical expectations,
Western European countries most strongly represent the liberal community (mean: .524).
The Anglo-American and Central European countries follow after clear intervals, .449 and
.380 respectively. The most striking difference is apparent between the Central European
countries and the other groups. Among these other groups of countries, the Orthodox
South-Eastern European countries have the relatively highest mean (.289) and the Eastern
European countries the relatively lowest (.247). As far as the liberal community is
concerned, the major cultural dividing line suggested by Huntington (1996) does exist,
separating the Western-Christian civilisation (including Central Europe) from the
Orthodox-Muslim civilisation in Eastern Europe.
Since characteristics that can relate to other types have been included in the two
discriminant analyses on libertarian and liberal democracy, we omit characteristics that are
theoretically quite unambiguous from the following considerations. In Figure 5, countries
are localised in a two-dimensional space mapping the proportion of citizens with a strong
sense of self-responsibility and those with a strong sense of solidarity. The regression line
shown in the figure represents the underlying libertarian-liberal-socialist continuum: strong
self-responsibility and weak solidarity characterise a libertarian community, and, vice
versa, a socialist community is characterised by strong solidarity and weak self-
responsibility, with the liberal community located between the two. The variance of no less
than 45 per cent explained by the regression shows that the assumption of this underlying
continuum is justified. If we take the 50 per cent threshold in each case to ensure better
orientation in the spatial classification of countries, the only country that simultaneously
scores high on self-responsibility and low on solidarity is the United States. Accordingly,
the United States is by far the most libertarian community, and “American exceptionalism”
(Lipset 1996) is clearly in evidence. Surprisingly, an above average proportion of Swedes
have a pronounced sense of self-responsibility, while evincing much greater solidarity than
Americans. This high degree of Swedes' sense of self-responsibility can be ascribed to two
aspects. First, the measurement of “self-responsibility” relates to the respective country’s
status quo (see Appendix 2). Second, Swedes place a relatively strong emphasis on the
value of self-responsibility ideologically, thus justifying the welfare state in part with the
ability for self-responsibility (Rothstein 1998).
In the upper left-hand part of the space, which is defined by strong solidarity and weak
self-responsibility, thus delimiting a socialist community, we find all the countries from
Central and Eastern Europe − plus Spain as the only Western European country. Within
this cluster of countries, no further differentiation by geographical region is possible. For
example, two of the countries we have assigned to Central Europe − Hungary and East
Figure 5: Location of Countries on the Libertarian-Liberal-Socialist Dimension
(a) Proportion of respondents with high solidarity (see Appendix 2); (b) Proportion of respondents with high self-responsibility (see Appendix 2)
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Germany − together with the Eastern European countries Russia, Ukraine, and Moldova,
form the outermost fringe of the cluster, thus representing the relatively most socialist
communities. In contrast, two Central European countries − Slovenia and the Czech
Republic − together with Romania are gathered at the opposite fringe of the cluster in the
direction of the Western countries. The countries deviating most from the regression line
are West Germany and Norway. They are average on self-responsibility, but solidarity is
below average in Norway and above average in West Germany.
The two dimensions in Figure 6 relate to the constitutive characteristics of a republican
or civic community. A fundamental normative concept in this type of democratic
community is that the individual and not government should bear primary responsibility
for the individual’s affairs (see Figure 2). The same is demanded by libertarians; but, in
contrast to libertarians, republicans do not assume that collective goals can be attained only
indirectly through the  mechanisms of the market. They stress active co-operation between
citizens to realise common projects (Putnam 1993; Fukuyama 1999). The resource on
which such co-operation can draw is termed social capital. Social capital consists
primarily in shared values and norms of reciprocity and co-operation. A consequence of
the mutual assumption that such values and norms apply, and of experience with relevant
action is trust or confidence in the other members of the community. Trust in others is
therefore frequently used as an indicator of the social capital of a community. Co-operative
values and norm orientations induce citizens to participate actively in voluntary
associations, and this in its turn stabilises the social capital. Putnam (1993) therefore refers
to civil or voluntary associations as “social structures of co-operation”. In Figure 6, active
participation by citizens in two or more voluntary associations is termed “civic
engagement”.
The link between “civic engagement” and “trust in others” that Putnam posits is
controversial. As the regression analysis shows (R² = .344) this assumption is confirmed by
our data at least at the aggregate level of the countries under study. The classification of
countries in the two-dimensional space of a republican community reveals a marked
difference between Anglo-American and Western European countries on the one hand and
the countries from Central and Eastern Europe on the other. The latter show less trust in
others and less civic engagement. The only Western European country in the group is
Spain. Taking the analysis results of this section for Central and Eastern Europe as a
whole, we find a positive and a negative aspect: they relatively clearly represent a socialist
community and just as clearly do not represent a republican community.
Figure 6: Location of Countries in a Two-Dimensional Space of Republican Community
(a) Percentage of respondents who trust in other people (see Appendix 2); (b) Percentage of respondents who are active members in two or more voluntary
associations (see Appendix 2).
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Among the Anglo-American and Western European countries, there is none that exhibits
both strong confidence in others and strong civic engagement. Thus, we cannot identify a
“pure” case of a republican community. Two configurations among these countries are evi-
dent. First, the two Nordic countries Norway and Sweden with an average level of civic
engagement and a high level of trust in others, and, second, the two Anglo-American coun-
tries Australia and the United States with an average level of trust in others and a high
level of civic engagement.
4. Summary and Conclusions
Development towards a politically integrated and geographically more comprehensive
Europe appears to be irreversible. But the general dynamic of development offer
fundamental options that have yet to be decided. One is the extent of political integration
through European institutions. The central issue is how strongly the competence to make
binding decisions is to be transferred from the nation states to the supranational regime of
the EU. Another is the matter of the eastern border, the question which countries should
belong to the EU. This is the point of reference for our study. Besides economic aspects,
the question of the eastward enlargement of the EU is of strategic importance for the
formation of a European demos. Every institutional arrangement of the EU needs to be
legitimated, and the more strongly the decisions of these institutions directly impact the life
world of the citizen, the greater is the need for legitimation. The addressee of this
legitimation of a European regime and European politics is a European demos. For
legitimation to be successful, a merely formal demos is presumably insufficient. Over and
above legally defined membership, it should constitute a political community with a
collective identity citizens can subjectively attribute to themselves and with which they can
identify.
We proceed from two premises. First, that the collective identity of the European demos
is grounded in subjectively perceived commonality in political values and behaviours;
second, that objectively demonstrable commonality in both regards provides the potential
for the formation of a collective identity. Against this background, we have attempted to
answer two questions. First, the extent to which political values and behaviours are shared
by the citizens of European countries; second, the extent to which there are systematic
differences between Western, Central, and Eastern Europe, and where possible cultural
borders lie. The most important results of our analysis can be summed up as follows.
Regardless of what institutional form the regime of the EU will ultimately take, it will be
a democratic form of government. Moreover, one of the key criteria for a country to join
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the EU is that it has a stable democracy. However, a democracy can function and survive
only if the demos as the ultimate sovereign also exhibits appropriate values and
behaviours. In a first step, we have therefore empirically determined the extent to which
societal community in the countries under study can be described as democratic, and what
differences there are between countries and groups of countries.
Differences are apparent between groups of countries, but − with one exception − they
are not very pronounced. They can be mapped on a geographical west-east axis. The
relatively most democratic communities are to be found in the Anglo-American and
Western European countries. The countries in which the democratic community is least
developed are the Muslim countries in South-Eastern Europe and the Eastern European
countries. Leaving aside the Anglo-American countries and regressing the scores of
individual countries for the democratic community on a geographical west-east axis, no
less than 62 per cent of variance can be explained. In certain measure, this result is in
keeping with Huntington’s (1996) theory. However, in contrast to Huntington’s
assumptions, no threshold can be identified between West and East, only a continuous
decline in the extent of a democratic community.
The exception mentioned above is concerned with the countries of Eastern Europe, and,
in our parlance, this means the Slavic successor states to the Soviet Union plus Moldova
(Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova). Albania also belongs to the group. In all these
countries, “law-abidingness” is clearly below average, and in every case there are fewer
than 25 per cent “solid democrats” among the citizenry (see Figure 4). According to our
criteria, there is therefore, at least currently, no solid democratic community in these
countries. Besides the longer-term factors we have mentioned (religion, empire, Leninist
regime, and modernity), the party systems are presumably responsible for this result. In all
these countries, the party system is shaped by parties that support at least the introduction
of autocratic elements into the existing governmental system, if not the imposition of
autocratic systems as a whole (Klingemann 2000; Klingemann and Hofferbert 2000). The
democratic transformation of the party system, in addition to economic development, is
therefore a structural prerequisite that could strengthen the democratic community in these
countries.
Whilst there are relatively slight differences between the countries under study as
regards the democratic community in general, this is far from being the case with the types
of community. This is particularly clear if one considers the libertarian-liberal-socialist
dimension. According to our analysis, the United States is indubitably a libertarian
community. The vast majority of American citizens consider that not the state but the
individual is responsible for his own life; at the same time solidarity with the
disadvantaged is very weak (see Figure 5). All the countries of Central and Eastern Europe
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offer a contrast to the United States. In these countries strong self-responsibility is evinced
by less than a third of citizens, and in most countries by even less than 20 per cent. A
majority, however, exhibits strong solidarity with the disadvantaged. Thus, on the basis of
these two characteristics, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe can be considered
socialist communities.
The two other Anglo-American countries (Australia and New Zealand), as well as the
Western European countries score between the United States and the Central and Eastern
European countries on self-responsibility. On solidarity the figures are at a similarly low
level as that of the United States, the only exception being West Germany. Overall, these
countries can therefore be classified as liberal communities, which are, however, closer to
the libertarian United States than to the socialist Central and Eastern European
communities.
Following on from the studies by Putnam (1993) and Fukuyama (1999), we have opera-
tionalized the republican community by the two dimensions “civic engagement” and “trust
in others”. The classification of countries in the space defined by these two dimensions
again shows a clear West-East difference. Most republican are the Anglo-American
countries United States, Australia, and New Zealand. Decidedly not republican, in contrast,
are the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. “Civic engagement” is weak, “trust in
others” is weak. The strong etatist orientation among citizens in Central and Eastern
Europe is thus complemented and accordingly still further stabilised by a lack of civic
society elements.
The question of the eastward enlargement of the EU can be discussed and answered
from a variety of standpoints. For example, economic or geo-political considerations can
play a role. The perspective taken by our analysis is that of the implications of eastward
enlargement for the development of a European demos. This, in turn, is the condition for a
viable European democracy. The greater the differences are between countries, the lower is
the potential for a European identity on which a European demos can base.
Our study identifies three substantial dividing lines. The first runs between America and
Europe, as already posited by Lipset (1996). For our purposes, however, this is of
secondary importance. The second divides Western Europe from Central and Eastern
Europe. The countries in these two parts of Europe represent different types of democratic
community. At this political cultural level, Huntington’s (1996) thesis of a cultural
dividing line within Europe is confirmed to a certain extent. According to the theoretical
premises of our analysis, every eastward enlargement poses integration problems and
increases the difficulty of constituting a European demos. The West-East difference we
have described is concerned with differing types of democratic community. Between the
countries of Europe there is little difference in the political values and behaviours that are
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essential to a democracy. The potential for Europeans in Western, Central, and Eastern
Europe to consider each other as democrats, and to integrate this understanding in their
collective identity is thus considerable.
The Slavic successor nations to the Soviet Union (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and
Moldova) together with Albania are the exception. They cannot, at least not yet, be
considered democratic communities, and in all the analyses we have conducted, they offer
a serious contrast to the Western European countries and, to some extent, also to the
countries in Central and Eastern Europe. This is the third dividing line we identify. Taking
account only of political cultural points of view, the eastern border of the EU would have
to be drawn before these countries. However, there is also reason to believe that
democratic institutions may be supportive in creating a democratic community.
Appendix 1
Criteria for a democratic community
Cultural level
1. Support of democratic rule
Item 1 “I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think
about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very
good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country?”
“Having a democratic political system”
Item 2 “I'm going to read off some things that people sometimes say about a democratic
political system. Could you please tell me if you agree strongly, agree, disagree or disagree
strongly, after I read each one of them?”
“Democracy may have problems but it's better than any other form of government.”
Scores of the two items are added to form the index “Support of democratic rule”. Scale
values run from 2 “low support for democratic rule” to 8 “high support for democratic
rule”. Table 3 presents proportion of respondents with scale values 6-8.
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2. Support of autocratic rule
Item 1 “I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think
about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very
good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country?”
“Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and
elections.”
Item 2 “I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think
about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very
good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country?”
“Having the army rule.”
Scores of the two items are added to form the index “Support of autocratic rule”. Scale
values run from 2 “low support of autocratic rule” to 8 “high support of autocratic rule”.
Table 3 presents proportion of respondents with scale values 6-8.
Structural level
3. Support for current political system of own country
Item 1 “People have different views about the system for governing this country. Here is a
scale for rating how well things are going: 1 means very bad and 10 means very good.”
“Where on this scale would you put the political system as it is today?”
Scale values run from 1 “very bad” to 10 “very good”. Table 3 presents the proportion of
respondents with scale values 6-10.
4. Confidence in governmental institutions
“I am going to name a number of organisations. For each one, could you tell me
how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot
of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all?”
Item 1 “Political parties”
Item 2 “The government in ...”
Item 3 “Parliament”
Scores of the three items are added to form the index “Confidence in governmental institu-
tions”. Scale values run from 3 “low confidence” to 12 “high confidence”. Table 3 presents
proportion of respondents with scale values 8-12.
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Process level
5. Illegitimacy of violence
Item 1 “Here's one more statement. How strongly do you agree or disagree with it?”
(agree strongly, agree, disagree, disagree strongly)
“Using violence to pursue political goals is never justified.”
Scale values run from 1 “disagree strongly” to 4 “agree strongly”. Table 3 presents propor-
tion of respondents with scale values 3-4.
6. Law abidingness
“Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always
be justified, never be justified, or something in between, using this card” (Inter-
viewer: read out statements. Code one answer for each statement.)
Item 1 “Claiming government benefits to which you are not entitled.”
Item 2 “Avoiding a fare on public transport.”
Item 3 “Cheating on taxes if you have a chance.”
Scores of the three items are added to form the index “Law abidingness”. Scale values run
from 3 “low degree of law abidingness” to 30 “high degree of law abidingness”. Table 3
presents proportion of respondents with scale values 24-30.
Appendix 2
Criteria of different types of democratic community
Cultural level
1. Self-responsibility
Item 1 “Now I'd like you to tell me your views on various issues. How would you place
your views on this scale? 1 means you agree completely with the statement on the left; 10
means you agree completely with the statement on the right; and if your views fall some-
where in between, you can choose any number in between.”
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1 “The government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is pro-
vided for”
10 “People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves”
Scale values run from 1 “low self-responsibility” to 10 “high self-responsibility”. Table 6.1
presents proportion of respondents with scale values 7-10.
2. Solidarity with the disadvantaged
Item 1 “Why in your opinion, are there people in this country who live in need? Here are
two opinions: Which come closest to your view?”
1 “They are poor because of laziness and lack of will power.”
2 “They are poor because society treats them unfairly.”
Item 2 “In your opinion, do most poor people in this country have a chance of escaping
from poverty, or is there very little chance of escaping?”
1 “They have a chance.”
2 “here is very little chance.”
Scores of the two items are added to form the index “solidarity with the disadvantaged”
Scale values run from 2 “low solidarity” to 4 “high solidarity”. Table 6.1 presents propor-
tion of respondents with scale value 4.
3. Trust in others
Item 1 “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you
can't be too careful in dealing with people?”
1 “Most people can be trusted.”
0 “Can't be too careful, don't know, no answer.”
Table 6.1 presents proportion of respondents with scale value 1.
4. Work ethic
Item 1 “Now I'd like you to tell me your views on various issues. How would you place
your views on this scale? 1 means you agree completely with the statement on the left; 10
means you agree completely with the statement on the right; and if your views fall some-
where in between, you can choose any number in between.”
1 “Hard work doesn't generally bring success -- it's more a matter of luck and con-
nections.”
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10 “In the long run, hard work usually brings a better life.”
Table 6.1 presents proportion of respondents with scale values 7-10 (“hard work”).
5. Ethic tolerance
“Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always
be justified, never be justified, or something in between, using this card.”
Item 1 “Homosexuality”
Item 2 “Prostitution”
Item 3 “Abortion”
Item 4 “Divorce”
Scores of the four items are added to form the index “Ethic tolerance”. Scale values run
from 4 “low ethic tolerance” to 40 “high ethic tolerance”. Table 6.1 presents proportion of
respondents with scale values 29-40.
Structural level
6. Private ownership
Item 1 “Now I'd like you to tell me your views on various issues. How would you place
your views on this scale? 1 means you agree completely with the statement on the left; 10
means you agree completely with the statement on the right; and if your views fall some-
where in between, you can choose any number in between.”
1 “Government ownership of business and industry should be increased.”
10 “Private ownership of business and industry should be increased.”
Table 6.2 presents proportion of respondents with scale values 7-10 (“private ownership”).
7. Management of enterprise
Item 1 “There is a lot of discussion about how business and industry can be managed.
Which of these four statements comes closest to your opinion?”
1 “The owners should run their business or appoint the managers.”
0 “The owners and the employees should participate in the selection of
managers;”
“The government should be the owner and appoint the managers;”
“The employees should own the business and should elect the managers.”
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Table 6.2 presents proportion of respondents with scale value 1.
Process level
8. Political motivation
Item 1 “Please say, for each of the following, how important it is in your life. Would you
say ...”
“Politics”
is very important, rather important, not very important or not at all important?
Item 2 “How interested would you say you are in politics?”
very interested, somewhat interested, not very interested, not at all interested?
Scale values run from 2 “low motivation” to 8 “high motivation involvement”. Table 6.2
presents proportion of respondents with scale values 6-8.
9. Civic engagement
“Now I am going to read off a list of voluntary organisations; for each one, could
you tell me whether you are an active member, an inactive member or not a mem-
ber of that type of organisation?”
Item 1 “Church or religious organisation”
Item 2 “Sport or recreation organisation”
Item 3 “Art, music or educational organisation”
Item 4 “Labour union”
Item 5 “Political party”
Item 6 “Environmental organisation”
Item 7 “Professional organisation”
Item 8 “Charitable organisation”
Item 9 “Any other voluntary organisation”
Scores of the nine items (“active membership”) are added to form the index “Civic engage-
ment”. Scale values run from 0 “no civic engagement” to 9 “high civic engagement”. Table
6.2 presents proportion of respondents with scale values 2-9.
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